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1. Introduction 
Immediately after the appearance of first computers more than sixty years ago, the idea of 
the creation of artificial intelligence similar to that of humans has inspired activity of 
thousands of outstanding individuals. Interesting results have been achieved in this 
endeavor but the situation still seems unsatisfactory. With exception of very narrow 
domains such as chess playing, intelligent systems cannot compete with humans or even 
animals. Several factors may be the reason of this situation. In this chapter, I consider one of 
the most important reasons: there are serious problems in the theory of intelligent systems 
and, accordingly, in theoretical approaches to the building of artificial intelligence. 
Therefore, the consideration of fundamental principles of intelligence may be an appropriate 
method for constructing effective systems of AI. 
Although there is no clear definition for the term ‘intelligence’, it is intuitively 
understandable that intelligence is an attribute of goal-directed systems. A goal-directed 
system has various goals, which the system attempts to achieve through interactions with 
the environment based on diverse methods or means. Intelligence characterizes the efficacy 
of such systems in the achievement of its goals (Russell & Norvig, 2003). Humans and 
animals undoubtedly are goal-directed systems and observations of their activities reveal 
two obvious classes of such systems. 
One class that may underlie the activity of nonhuman animals contains goal-directed 
systems in which basic goals and means are determined jointly in the moment of the 
creation of a system. A system belonging to this class functions as follows: one or several 
basic goals are activated along with a broad diversity of means innately associated with 
those goals. In accordance with the requirements of the situation, one or several of such 
means are performed and then associations between those goals and means are changed 
through feedback loops using hard-wired relations between goals and the result of 
performance or/and those relations generate new means, which are consequences of some 
changes in ongoing means. It seems that various systems in neural nets, evolutionary 
computing, reinforcement learning, etc correspond to this class of goal-directed systems 
(Haykin, 1998; Bäck, 1996; Holland, 1975; Leslie et al, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
The observation of human actions and introspection allow us to define the other class in 
which goals and means can be constructed arbitrarily and independently from each other. If 
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a goal is constructed arbitrarily, then searching through all of possible means is the only 
method for selecting one or several means appropriate to achieve the goal. The efficacy of 
those means may increase the probability of their usage in similar situations; however, this 
class does not suggest unequivocal methods based on feedback loops to construct novel 
means. Various, largely symbolic, systems can be related to this class (Bertino, Piero & 
Zarria, 2001; Jackson, 1998; Newell, 1990). 
Because these classes are so obvious, it is very reasonable to assume that any AI project can 
be attributed to one of the classes (though some projects may combine characteristics of 
both). Like other technical systems, AI projects are not intended to imitate their natural 
counterparts but rather attempt to achieve “natural functionality”. The fact that the objective 
of Artificial Intelligence as a scientific and engineering activity is the full-scale functionality 
of human intelligence means AI researchers implicitly suggest that humans can be 
attributed to one or both of these classes. However, in my opinion this supposition is 
doubtful.  
Undoubtedly, like other animals humans have a complex structure of innate goals 
associated with survival and reproduction. As a result, some scholars attribute humans to 
the first class of goal-directed systems. For example, behaviorism suggested an innate 
motivation mechanism in order to establish connections between goals and means through 
reward and punishment (Heckhausen, 1980). Currently, evolutionary psychology is very 
explicit in supposing that humans have an innate repertoire of goals and domain-specific 
modules (Tooby &Cosmides 1992; Tooby, Cosmides & Barrett, 2005). However, the 
attribution of humans to the first class system is unable to explain the diversity and rapid 
alterations of actions either at the level of a single individual, or at that of a whole society 
(Buller, 1998). 
This inability hints that humans belong to the second-class systems. The main problem, 
which faces such systems, is a combinatorial explosion owing to the need to search through 
the potentially infinite number of possible means. However, people regularly make effective 
and flexible decisions without being overwhelmed by their decision-making processes. 
Some ideas to explain how the mind avoids a combinatorial explosion have been suggested 
(Newell, 1990), but they do not seem satisfactory (Cooper & Shallice, 1995). Moreover, 
although people are able to apply the strategy of deliberately searching among several 
conscious alternatives, some problems demonstrate that the thinking system is reluctant to 
use searching.  
Consider, for example the following simplest chess riddle: White: Ke1, Rf2, Rh1; Black: Ka1. 
White to play and mate in one. When the author (P.P.) was acquainted with the problem he 
found that many poor chess players (and P.P. himself), who were, of course, familiar with 
the chess rules, could not solve the riddle or solved it after many attempts. However, any 
chess program immediately finds the solution: castling O-O. Indeed, since White should 
mate in one, in order to solve this problem it is necessary to generate each formally possible 
move for White in the given position, and to test whether this move is the solution. Such a 
searching procedure is available for the computer program but often not available for a 
human. 
Everyday experience seems to demonstrate that people seldom use searching among 
possible alternatives. Instead, they prefer (often unconsciously) a routine action. In 
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accordance with this opinion, the dual-processes models (Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 
2003) have supposed that the mind includes two components. One component uses 
searching procedures and accordingly is responsible for deliberate actions. The other 
component, which complies with the systems of the first class, underlies routine, automatic 
actions. It is suggested that in routine everyday situations, in which, according to such 
theories, the vast majority of actions is performed, the routine component effectively selects 
an appropriate action. Searching and planning are involved only in unusual situations. 
Some unspecified mechanisms constrain searching in those rare cases when the latter is 
necessary.  
In my opinion, however, nonroutine and routine situations are intertwined more strongly 
than it may be consciously acknowledged. The mind cannot be separated into the two 
components. For example, if an individual is hungry, she may open her home refrigerator 
without the clear awareness of this process. However, people usually do not open 
somebody’s refrigerators automatically even if they are hungry. No special intention to 
inhibit the wish “to open somebody’s refrigerator” is necessary in such situations. 
Obviously, there is no universal routine “not to open somebody’s refrigerator”, simply 
because it is very difficult to define unequivocally and finally what refrigerators are 
permitted to open. Therefore, it is necessary to suggest that ongoing goals somehow control 
activity when an individual attends to the refrigerator, allowing or forbidding the opening 
of the latter. In the same manner, ongoing goals unconsciously involve in most of routine 
situations even when the individual believes that some component of her activity is 
automatic. With the involvement of ongoing goals in most of everyday situations, the 
problem of combinatorial explosion becomes unresolved for the dual-processes models. 
Whereas, AI research is not intended directly to imitate human intelligence but it seems 
obvious that a certain view on human intelligence is a very important tacit heuristic to AI 
researchers and strongly influences AI studies. In my opinion, the analysis of the two 
conventional classes of goal-directed systems demonstrates that human activity hardly can 
be derived from these classes and this may be a very serious factor constraining AI research. 
I suggest that the standard view on possible classes of goal-directed systems is incomplete 
and consider a more complex categorization below. I present, based on this classification, a 
new view on human goal-directed activity as a characteristic of a particular class of goal-
directed systems. Some ideas on how this class can be represented in the brain are 
considered. These ideas form the basis for the simulation of simple models of goal-directed 
activity. Some proposals on how this novel understanding of humans as goal-directed 
systems can be used to create intelligent systems are also considered in the article.  
2. Two-dimensional classification of goal-directed systems and the idea of 
joint synthesis 
The two classes of goal-directed systems are usually considered as two poles of one axis and 
as a result, it seems that there are no other classes. However, a more profound view on the 
classes demonstrates that the situation may be more complex. Indeed, the first class contains 
goal-directed systems in which basic goals and means are constructed innately and together. 
In the systems of the second-class goals and means can be constructed arbitrarily and 
separately from each other. It is easy to discern that the words “innately” and “separately” 
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are not antonyms neither are the words “together” and “arbitrarily”. This may mean that 
the two classes are only an apparent projection of a two-dimensional structure, in which one 
dimension can be characterized as “innate” versus “arbitrary” or “learned” and another 
dimension as “constructed together” versus “constructed separately”. With this assumption, 
a representation of this structure can be given as the following table. 
 
 Together Separately 
Innately Goals and means are 
constructed innately and 
together 
Goals and means are 
constructed innately and 
separately 
Arbitrarily Goals and means are 
constructed arbitrarily and 
together 
Goals and means are 
constructed arbitrarily and 
separately 
Table 1. Classification of goal-directed systems 
This results in a more complicated structure with four classes. Prior to the consideration of 
this structure, it seems useful to raise an issue of whether this classification is fundamental 
enough. Undoubtedly, there may be many various sources of classification: for example, the 
diversity of goals or the number of levels in the system can be used to classify. However, 
obviously, the most important classification should be based on key characteristics of goal-
directed systems. In my view, the table reflects such fundamental characteristics because 
one axis is the capability of a goal-directed system to change and adjust and the second 
dimension is the relationship between the main components of any goal-directed system, i.e. 
its goals and means.  
It is easy to discern that two cells in the table correspond to the conventional classes but two 
new classes emerge from the other cells. One new class is goal-directed systems, in which 
goals and means are constructed innately and separately. Such architecture is, however, 
logically impossible. Indeed, if basic goals and means of a certain goal-directed system are 
defined at the moment of the creation of the system, then a common configuration 
undoubtedly underlies them and they cannot be constructed separately.  
The other new class is goal-directed systems, in which goals and means can be constructed 
arbitrarily and jointly. If one suggests that the construction of a goal and means in such a 
system is a self-organizing process, which is based on an extremal principle, e.g. that the 
costs on the synthesis should be minimal, then particular advantages of this class can be 
easily revealed. Indeed, because the goal and means in a system of this class are constructed 
jointly, there is no need to search among a potentially infinite set of means to satisfy the 
given goal; this is a simple solution to the problem of combinatorial explosion. On the other 
hand, the possibility to synthesize goals and means arbitrarily indicates the actions of the 
systems belonging to this class may be very flexible and adaptive. With such characteristics 
of this class, my main idea is that human beings are goal-directed systems in which arbitrary 
goals and means are synthesized jointly.  
One may propose some objections to this hypothesis. First, if a goal and means are 
constructed together then the means ought to be appropriate for achieving the goal. 
However, people often understand what goal must be achieved but they cannot suggest 
appropriate means to achieve the goal. However, it is necessary to note that the joint 
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synthesis is not a method to create the best action (this is impossible due to combinatorial 
explosion) but a method to create any action (because the number of possible actions is 
infinite, in principle). To a certain degree, an alternative to the action constructed by the 
ongoing joint synthesis is not another action but rather its absence. Therefore, the idea of 
joint synthesis is not hurt by the fact that people are able to imagine, plan, or pursue 
completely arbitrary even unachievable goals. Because even when the individual thinks that 
there is no method to achieve the goal, nevertheless an inappropriate method is chosen 
because the selection of a certain aspect of reality among the infinite number of other 
possible aspects occurred.  
Second, experience teaches us that one goal can be achieved by various methods, ways (this 
is the principle of equifinality (Bertalanffy, 1968)) and that one method can be applied to 
achieve various goals. These obvious facts, which underlie one of the two conventional 
classes, seem inconsistent with the joint synthesis hypothesis (referred to as the JSH 
hereinafter). In my opinion, the idea that goals and means can be constructed separately is 
correct at the level of social practice but a psychological illusion at the level of psychological 
mechanisms of a particular action.  
In order to clear this idea, imagine that one needs to achieve the 35th floor of a skyscraper. 
Firstly, this can be made by means of an elevator. If no elevator can be used (e.g. there is no 
voltage), it is possible to go upstairs. Finally, if the staircase is destroyed then one can climb 
on the wall using necessary tools. It seems one invariable goal can be combined with various 
methods to achieve it. However, the first method is available for everyone because it 
requires no concentration of mental recourses. The second one can be accepted when there is 
a serious need to reach the goal. In addition, the last one can be used only under extreme 
circumstances requiring the strongest concentration of will and energy. In other words, from 
the position of internal processes each way requires a certain psychological arrangement 
with special goals and this arrangement is acknowledged by any individual as distinctive 
from the others. Therefore, a change in the situation results in the alteration of goals at a 
particular level of the hierarchy of goals. It is reasonable to assume that the interaction 
between goals and means in the process of the construction of a goal-directed activity is a 
characteristic of any such activity.  
In my opinion, like other psychological illusions, such as, for example, the illusion of the 
instantaneous reaction to an external stimulus (the understanding that the reaction is not 
instant, occurred in 1823 only (Corsini & Auerbach, 1998)), the illusion of the separate 
construction of goals and means results from the fact that it is very difficult to combine the 
involvement in a particular activity with the simultaneous introspective monitoring of this 
activity. Indeed, when an individual pursues a particular everyday goal (e.g., shopping at 
the supermarket) she usually does not pay attention to all variations in the intermediate 
goals and means necessary for this multi-stage pursuit. As a result, the complex interplay of 
these intermediate processes is reflected by consciousness and memory only partially, while 
the success or failure in the achievement of the main goal is usually in the focus of 
consciousness. In addition, the detailed awareness of each stage in a multi-staged activity is 
merely impossible because this is able to destroy the activity itself. The result of these 
circumstances is, in my opinion, a false feeling of the separate formation and change of goals 
and means. 
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It is necessary to note that the hypothesis that the mind constructs the goal and means 
together does not imply that an individual deliberately cannot search through possible 
options as a method to determine an appropriate means. Indeed, the conscious idea to apply 
searching along with the awareness of several possible options may be the result of the 
ongoing synthesis.  
The validation of the JSH is easy. Indeed, because the hypothesis suggests that the mind 
constructs the goal and means of an action jointly following the criterion of minimal 
construction costs. This means that if there are no explicit preferences to choose among 
several possible actions then an action requiring minimal mental costs to be constructed is 
preferable. This action should be selected without intensive searching among probable 
alternatives. On the other hand, this choice should not be a result of the activation of a 
routine procedure and can be changed deliberately. A real experimentation to test these 
suppositions is possible but beyond the scope of this article (Prudkov &Rodina, 1999, 
Rodina &Prudkov, 2005). Instead, I consider a thought experiment, which, in my opinion, is 
sufficient to demonstrate the relevance of the JSH. 
Imagine that two individuals participate in this experiment, one of them is Experimenter, 
the other is Subject, accordingly, and the experiment takes place in London. The participants 
are discussing some problem and at a certain moment, Experimenter asks Subject to give 
him a pen without specifying the location of the pen. Many people have a pen in their 
pockets, and it is very probable that Subject is among them. Subject takes the pen out of the 
pocket and gives it to Experimenter. It is very reasonable to suggest that the construction of 
this action needs minimal mental costs. In response, however, Experimenter asks, “why did 
Subject take the pen out of the pocket instead of calling New York?” Subject is astonished by 
this question and then Experimenter says that there are many pens in New York and Subject 
could find a pen there. The astonishment of Subject means that his mind did not find among 
possible alternatives of the pen’s location but one may argue that this reflects the fact that 
Experimenter’s request is performed by the activation of a corresponding routine. It is 
obvious, however, that if Experimenter would merely ask Subject to find a pen in New York 
then Subject could easily convert this idea to a sequence of actions. Such a rapid adjustment 
to the situation cannot be provided by a routine. This is the result of a special goal-directed 
process. In my opinion, this simple situation, which can be easily repeated in reality, 
demonstrates the appropriateness of the idea of joint synthesis.  
Although the joint synthesis is a basic attribute of humans as goal-directed systems, the 
consideration of this characteristic alone may be insufficient to understand the whole 
diversity of human actions. Humans, of course, have innate mechanisms necessary for 
survival and reproduction and those, although are under control from more modern 
systems, influence actions and therefore, to a certain degree, humans can be considered as 
the goal-directed systems of the first class. On the other hand, using language and complex 
social skills, an individual can "emulate" the separation between goals and means. Indeed, 
by discussing some ideas with other people or by writing the ideas down and afterwards 
thinking about them, an individual can concentrate either on the goals or on the means of a 
goal-directed activity. The fact implies, to some extent, humans can be considered as 
systems with the separate and arbitrary construction of goals and means. However, it is the 
joint synthesis that determines the involvement of the other classes of goal-directed systems 
in human actions. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Intelligent Biosystems and the Idea of the Joint Synthesis of Goals and Means 
 
327 
It is usually suggested that a goal-directed activity pursues a clear and unequivocal goal and 
when the individual acknowledges that the outcome of the process meets its goal then the 
activity completes. However, in my opinion, the idea of a clear and unequivocal goal seems 
doubtful. Consider, for example, the situation with Experimenter and Subject above. 
Obviously, that Subject unconsciously converted the goal “to find a pen” into the goal “to 
find a pen in the pockets” and as a result, he is astonished by the proposal “to search a pen 
in New York”, though this proposal is consistent with the initial request. Obviously, the 
supposition “to search for a pen in another room” could astonish Subject to a lesser degree. 
Similarly, Experimenter would be stunned, if Subject could pull a giant pen (for example, 50 
centimeters in length) out of his bag though such a pen meets his request. On the other 
hand, a pen of a very unusual design but a standard size could wonder Experimenter less. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that Experimenter and Subject have some distributions of 
anticipations regarding the result of their goal-directed activities rather than unambiguous 
goals, but they acknowledge those anticipations only partially. 
I suggest that any goal-directed activity is a distribution of anticipations regarding the goal 
and means of the activity. The activation of some components of this distribution is 
determined by particular aspects of the situation and the changes in the situation results in 
the activation of slightly other components of the distribution. The construction and changes 
in the distribution are based on the criterion of minimal construction costs. 
A suggestion that the goal and means of a goal-directed process are some distributions leads 
to two fundamental conclusions. First, this means that there is no simple procedure to define 
when the goal is achieved because it may be difficult to find an unequivocal compliance 
between the distributed representation of the goal and the output of the activity. Therefore, 
the completion of an ongoing process is the result of the interaction between this process, 
the situation, and the hierarchy of other processes. In other words, there is no special 
comparator always able to compare the goal and the output of the activity and as a result, 
people sometimes do not acknowledge that the result of an ongoing activity does not 
respond to its initial goal. In my opinion, everyday experience is consistent with this 
suggestion. Consider, for example, an individual who plans to buy necessary goods at the 
supermarket. Sometimes the result of such activity is that an individual misses several 
objects planned. Instead, she purchases other goods but thinks that the goal of the action is 
achieved. 
Second, the vague representation of the goal and method implies that the sustainability of 
a goal-directed activity can be considered as its relatively autonomous attribute. Indeed, 
sustainability seems a one-dimensional parameter and hence less variable than 
multivariate distributions of goals and means that ought to meet the very complex 
structure of the situation. A proposal of the autonomy of sustainability seems unusual 
enough but perseveration, i.e., the involuntary and uncontrollable repetitions of a 
particular action, which is a very frequent attribute of disturbances in goal-directed 
behavior (Luria, 1966, 1972,1983; Joseph, 1999), clearly favors this proposal. Indeed, 
perseveration can be considered as the activation of a sustainable component, which, if 
the goal-directed system is damaged, persists regardless the influence of the situation or 
other processes.  
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3. Neural basis for the joint synthesis 
If the goal and means of a goal-directed activity are constructed together then it is of great 
importance to understand how this can be implemented in the brain because similar 
mechanisms can be used to create artificial goal-directed systems. Undoubtedly, human 
goal-directed activity is very complex and a detailed understanding of it is the beyond scope 
of this article. Instead, I consider the neural basis of a certain “ideal” goal-directed process 
suggesting it includes three obvious stages, i.e. initiation, execution, and termination. My 
approach meets most of the contemporary hypotheses, which consider that the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) plays a key role in goal-directed processes (E.K. Miller& Cohen, 2001; Wood& 
Grafman, 2003). In accordance with this position, I propose that the prefrontal cortex is 
heavily involved in the construction and maintenance of neural patterns representing goals 
and means.  
It is suggested that the capacity of the PFC to construct and maintain sustainable neural 
patterns is based on possible reverberatory characteristics of neurons in this structure 
(Fuster 1997). It can be supposed that owing to such reverberatory properties the emergence 
of sustainable characteristics of a neural pattern is, to a certain extent, autonomous from the 
emergence of its other characteristics. In other words, relatively weak changes in neurons of 
the PFC may be sufficient to make a pattern sustainable but more serious alterations are 
necessary to form its other characteristics. This underlines a relative autonomy of the 
sustainability of goal-directed processes at the cognitive level. 
It is suggested that the prefrontal cortex can be considered as blackboard architecture. 
Blackboard architecture consists of a set of specialized or stable processors that interact with 
each other using a blackboard, consisting of less stable, flexible elements. Some authors (van 
der Velde& de Kamps 2003, 2006) have suggested the idea that the prefrontal cortex uses 
this sort of architecture. This idea is consistent with the neural data. For example, this means 
that most of prefrontal neurons must flexibly adapt its activity to the ongoing task. And 30-
80 percents of prefrontal neurons of the monkey show selective responses to some aspect of 
that task’s events (Asaad et al 2000). However, it is necessary to emphasize a distinction 
between conventional views on blackboard architecture used in AI (Corkill 1991; Craig 
1995) and that used in this text. Unlike conventional models, the given model does not 
suggest an absolute difference between stable processors and flexible elements, i.e. stable 
processors can be converted to flexible elements and vice versa because both groups 
comprise of similar neurons and only the level of stability distinguishes them. 
It is reasonable to assume that a new goal-directed process emerges from the integration of 
various sources of information associated with the ongoing situation. So, it is hypothesized 
that prior to the construction of a new goal-directed process the prefrontal cortex can be 
considered as a blackboard system in which incoming sensory information and/or ongoing 
internal processes (emotions, innate drives, other goal-directed processes, especially those at 
higher levels, etc.) presented as spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity in the PFC and 
other brain structures are stable processors. Moreover, other ensembles of the PFC comprise 
a bulletin board with flexible elements. The construction of a new process started from 
interactions between stable processors and flexible elements and owing to such interactions, 
the characteristics of flexible elements become similar to some characteristics of stable 
processors. At the neural level, this means similar frequency or distribution of firing, etc. 
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and at the cognitive level this means some similar functions. After this, flexible elements 
with new functions start interacting with each other also exchanging its characteristics. It is 
reasonable to suggest that the more similar characteristics shared by some elements, the 
more probability of its interactions. For example, if neuron A has a synapse with neuron B 
then a probability that the discharge of neuron A results in the discharge of neuron B seems 
more than the same probability for two neurons that do not share a common synapse. The 
relationship between the similarity of elements and the probability of its interaction is the 
substantiation of the criterion of minimal construction costs. 
It is reasonable to expect that owing to interactions between elements, the resemblance of 
elements can be increased. As a result, a pattern joining many elements with similar 
characteristics gradually emerges and this pattern becomes sustainable. This indicates that 
the construction of a new process is completed. Although, elements in the pattern have 
something in common but there are some distinctions among them and this is a prerequisite 
for the distributed representation for the goal and means. 
It is suggested each pattern can be considered as a construction with two interconnected 
components: one component is responsible for the goal and the other for the means. Such a 
separation is based on the idea that some neurons in the pattern have mainly local 
connections within the prefrontal cortex (they comprise the goal component). Other neurons 
in the pattern are linked to other brain structures (those are the means component). Because 
the activity of neurons within the PFC is likely more reverberatory and self-sustained than 
that of neurons linked to other structures, the goal component can be more stable and 
persistent than the means component. 
Once a goal-directed process is constructed, some activation from the means component 
propagates to other brain structures, which are able to carry out the process, and its 
performance is initiated (B.T. Miller& D’Esposito 2005). Simultaneously, the components 
interact with each other; this stabilizes the means component while it receives feedback 
because of performing the process. Therefore, the fact that the process pursues the goal is a 
result of the stability in the goal component produced by self-sustainable characteristics of 
the PFC. It is possible to say that goal-directed processes are self-sustained gates, which 
amplify appropriate information and diminish inappropriate one. The components are 
constructed together but their architecture is slightly different. The functioning of 
components gradually increases these differences and this change may be a basis for an 
autonomous representation of goals and means in consciousness.  
As is emphasized above I do not suggest that the brain includes a special comparator, 
which monitors when the outcome of the process meets the goal, and then turns the 
process off. Simply, with the achievement of the goal, the current situation undergoes 
changes, thus not being able to support the ongoing process with appropriate 
information. To meet novel requirements of the situation, the construction of another 
process begins. Probably, more stable processes at a higher level of the goal-directed 
hierarchy supervising short-term ones also participate in the completion of the ongoing 
process. Free neural ensembles again become flexible components of the blackboard. It 
can be hypothesized that a real goal-directed process is a hierarchical multilevel structure 
joining many of such ideal processes.  
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4. Simulation of a goal-directed activity based on joint synthesis 
The hypothesis of joint synthesis and its possible neural implementation can be considered a 
basis for computer models of goal-directed activity. It is necessary to point out that these 
models are neither models of a certain aspect of human or animal activity nor 
implementations of goal-directed activity in the brain. They are simply intended to 
demonstrate how a goal-directed process can be constructed. The models share a common 
basis but have certain distinctive characteristics.  
4.1 A simple model of goal-directed activity (model 1)  
The architecture of the model is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Architecture of model 1 
The model consists of two fractions; one is the system in which a goal-directed activity 
should be constructed and the other is the environment influencing the state of the system. 
At the beginning, a new goal-directed process emerges within the system under a certain 
state of the environment and after changing the environment, the process pursues its goal 
associated with the initial state of the environment using the means constructed. 
The system includes one layer consisting of z autonomous modules and the output of the 
system is a summation of the outputs of its modules. Each module contains several n-
dimension vectors with real numbers as its components. These vectors are an input vector 
(IV), which is filled by information from the environment (its kth component is IVk, 
accordingly), a vector of coefficients (CV), and an output vector (OV). The functioning of the 
vectors is described below. Also, each module has an activation level (AL), a real number 
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from 0 to 1. With the idea of a relative autonomy of sustainability above, this parameter 
reflects the stability and activity of the module, i.e., as AL increases the functioning of the 
module becomes more stable. 
A fundamental characteristic of modules is that they interact with each other. The functional 
proximity between two elements is calculated as follows. First, the following characteristic 
for module i (and j, accordingly) at iteration m is computed 
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and then the functional proximity between i and j, fp(i,j) is 
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The interaction between module i and module j at iteration m occurs if fp(i,m) is less than a 
threshold (p1) plus a small noise. The fact that modules interacts only if its functional 
proximity is less than a threshold is an implementation of the idea of minimal construction 
costs. The result of the interaction between module i and module j is as follows: 
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It is suggested that modules interact in parallel and the formulae reflect this. Owing to 
interactions, the activation level of each module (for example, module i at iteration m) is also 
changed : 
 

  , , 1, , 1 * 4 * (1 )3 * i m i mi m i m t p ALAL p AL
z
  (6) 
where both p3 and p4 <1 and ti,m is the number of interactions between module i and the 
other modules of the system at iteration m.  
It is easy to see that as the AL of a module increases, the components of the module become 
less prone to change. In addition, if a module did not interact with other modules at the last 
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iteration, its AL should be decreased. Module i is able to influence the environment only if 
its AL exceeds a threshold (p5) at iteration m, then 
 
 , ,, ( ) ,
k k
i m i mk
i m
IV CV
OV
z
 otherwise , 0ki mOV   (7) 
The environment is also a n-dimension vector (E) and its kth component at iteration m is 
changed by the following formula: 
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  (8) 
It is not difficult to see that, unlike the analysis of neural mechanisms above, this model 
does not include special layers to form output. The objective of such a design is to avoid 
unnecessary difficulties conditioned by complex relations between such layers. These 
difficulties are able to complicate the understanding of the model’s functioning without 
clearing its main ideas. However, because each module has a complex structure with 
internal vectors such as CV and OV the model can be useful to understand the functioning 
of various goal-directed systems.  
In all simulations, the number of modules in the system (z) was 300 and the vectors in each 
module were three-dimensional. Real numbers were used as the stuff of all vectors in the 
system. A goal-directed activity was constructed as follows. First, 40 modules were 
considered as stable processors. Its coefficient vectors were filled by a constant plus small 
noise and its active levels was more than p5 (0.3). The other modules of the system were 
flexible elements. Its coefficient vectors were randomly filled by numbers from 0 to 100 and 
its ALs were randomly established at 0,06 plus small noise. Following this initialization, 
interactions between stable processors and flexible elements started. Five iterations of this 
process took place and p1 was 0,3. At this stage (stage 1), no outputs from the system 
influenced the environment. This corresponded to the construction of a goal-directed 
activity. After this, novel constants were established and the interaction between the system 
and the environment became possible. This stage (stage 2) meant the functioning of a goal-
directed activity.  
It is necessary to emphasize that the architecture of the model means stable processors are 
not a necessary condition for the interaction between the system and the environment. In 
principle, flexible elements are sufficient to provide the functioning of the system but in this 
case, the activity of the system must be less stable and persistent. To test this suggestion a 
special simulation was carried out. In this simulation no stable processors were formed but 
five iterations similar to those in simulation 1 were performed (stage 1, accordingly). After 
this, certain constants were selected and the interaction between the system and the 
environment became possible (stage 2).  
In both simulations all constants were 80, in other words, the goal of the activity in 
simulation 1 entirely met the initial state of its stable processors. After three iterations with 
such constants at stage 2, in both simulations the constants were forcefully established at 50 
during one iteration to estimate the stability of the models to random fluctuations. 
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Afterwards, the constants were 80 again. Because at any moment all constants were 
identical, the components of input and coefficients vectors in modules could be averaged 
within each vector and across all modules. As a result, one number was sufficient to 
describe the state of coefficients vectors at any iteration. In addition, Al averaged across all 
modules also was used as a characteristic of the process.  
It was suggested that owing to stable processors filled by 80 the coefficient vectors of the 
model with stable processors (CV-sp) should exceed those of the model without stable 
processors (CV-wsp) at stage 2. Moreover, CV-sp should be more stable after a sudden 
fluctuation in the constants of the environment. Also, AL-sp should be more than AL-wsp. 
The results of both simulations are in figure 2, where for convenience, ALs were multiplied 
by 100. 
 CV-sp 
 Al-sp
 CV-wsp
 AL-wsp0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Iterations
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Stage 1 Stage 2
Fluctuation
 
Fig. 2. The comparison of the results of two simulations. 
4.2 A model with perceptive spot (model 2) 
Though model 1 is able to demonstrate some characteristics of goal-directed activity, it 
seems too primitive for serious actions. Model 2 is more complex, its system has a 
perceptive spot, which includes the modules whose input vectors are filled by a useful 
signal from the environment while the input vectors of the other modules are filled by noise. 
Both a useful signal and noise are real numbers but the amplitude of noise is considerably 
less. The system is able to move the center of the spot but cannot change its size. The 
www.intechopen.com
 
Intelligent Systems 
 
334 
behavior of the system in model 1 is similar to the activity of an inseсt, which moves in the 
environment filled by a nutrient with variable concentration. Model 2 is, to some extent, 
similar to the action of an eye of an animal.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Architecture of model 2 
The modules in this model are similar to those in model 1 but also include a vector of 
differences (DV), its functioning is described below. In order to avoid the spurious activity 
of modules filled by noise, a threshold of perception is used, i.e. module i is able to 
participate in the activity of the system at iteration m only if  
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The interaction between module i and module j at iteration m occurs if the distance between 
the modules, i.e. |(i-j)/z| is less than a certain parameter (p2) and the functional proximity 
i.e.  
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is less than a threshold (p3) plus a small noise. The result of the interaction between module 
i and module j is as follows: 
Environment 
                                                  SYSTEM  
M 
O 
D 
U 
L 
E 
1 
M 
O 
D 
U 
L 
E 
2 
M 
O 
D 
U 
L 
E 
3 
M 
O 
D 
U 
L 
E 
i 
M 
O 
D 
U 
L 
E 
j 
M 
O 
D 
U 
L 
E 
z 
Perceptive spot
www.intechopen.com
 
Intelligent Biosystems and the Idea of the Joint Synthesis of Goals and Means 
 
335 
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Owing to interactions, the characteristics of the vector of differences (DV) of module i at 
iteration m are also changed as follows : 
     , , , , 15 * ( ) (1 5) ,k k k ki m i m i m i mDV p CV IV p DV  p5<1  (13) 
it is possible to say that CV is the long-term memory of a module and DV is its short-term 
memory. 
The modules with AL exceeding a threshold ( p8 in this model or p5 in the previous one) , 
also, influence the position of the center of perceptive spot. This position (center position or 
CP) is determined at iteration m as follows: 

 

  1 , 1
1
10 * ( )
i z
m m i m m
i
CP CP p T CP  
and  , /i mT i z  if , 8i mAL p , otherwise , 1i m mT CP .  (14) 
It is suggested the position of the left boundary of the system is 0 and that of the right 
boundary is 1. 
As is emphasized above, only the modules, which are within perceptive spot, are filled by 
information from the environment, i.e. if |CPm –i/z| ≤ p11, then for module i at iteration 
m+1 
  , 1k ki m mIV E noise   
 and for modules which do not meet this inequality (15) 
  , 1ki mIV noise .   
The formulae for computing activation level (AL), output vector OV, and the environment 
are identical those in model 1. 
An idea underlying the usage of model is that under certain circumstances the input vectors 
of modules i.e. the state of the environment and the vectors of coefficients in the system 
ought to converge to each other. The results of a simulation intended to test this assumption 
are presented in table 2. In this simulation as well as in the simulations below, the number of 
modules in the system (z) was 300 and the vectors in each module were three-dimensional. 
The constants of environment vector in this simulation were 10, 50, and 90, accordingly. 
Perceptive spot covered all modules, and each module was able to interact with all of the 
rest i.e. p2 and p11 were 0,95. The threshold for interactions (p3) was 4,2. The other 
parameters are in Appendix, they were kept invariable through the other simulations. The 
values averaged across the components of input vectors were used as the description of the 
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influence of the environment and the averaged components of the vectors of coefficients 
were considered as the characteristic of change in coefficients. The AL averaged across all 
modules reflected activity in the whole system.  
 
Iteration AL IV1 CV1 IV2 CV2 IV3 CV3 
1 0,3 15,03 -3,5 55,04 -3,78 94,87 -3,59 
2 0,44 23,96 1,43 80,62 11,16 137,56 21,05 
3 0,52 31,49 4,64 104,35 20,66 177,83 36,8 
4 0,63 35,97 8,55 119,68 32,02 204,08 55,69 
5 0,68 36,76 10,23 124,31 37,03 212,5 64,1 
6 0,73 36,18 11,76 124,02 41,71 212,28 71,98 
7 0,78 34,34 12,75 120,1 44,83 205,74 77,26 
8 0,81 32,18 13,44 114,51 47,06 196,08 81,01 
9 0,84 30,03 13,89 108,31 48,58 186,22 83,57 
10 0,86 27,87 14,19 102,51 49,68 176,43 85,41 
11 0,89 25,8 14,36 96,86 50,36 167,03 86,55 
12 0,9 24,24 14,36 91,99 50,58 158,47 86,93 
13 0,92 23,05 14,31 87,67 50,6 151,7 86,97 
14 0,94 22,23 14,27 84,33 50,55 146,17 86,91 
15 0,94 21,12 14,25 81,75 50,55 141,95 86,91 
16 0,95 20,48 14,25 79,46 50,57 138,81 86,94 
17 0,95 19,87 14,25 78,13 50,59 135,9 86,97 
18 0,95 19,75 14,26 76,47 50,61 133,62 87,01 
IV1, IV2, IV3 are the first, second, and third averaged components of input vectors; CV1, CV2, CV3 are the 
same components of the vectors of coefficients. 
Table 2. Simulation of the convergence between input vectors and vectors of coefficients. 
It is easy to see that input vectors and the vectors of coefficients indeed converged, though 
this process was incomplete probably because, as the mean AL approached to 1, changes in 
the system became practically impossible.  
A goal-directed process was constructed as follows. First, one region of modules (or several 
regions consecutively) was considered as perceptive spot and the state of modules within 
this region was changed under a certain state of the environment. The position of the spot 
could not be changed during this stage. This corresponds to the formation of stable 
processors. And the modules beyond the spot were considered as flexible elements. At the 
second stage, perceptive spot covered all modules of the system, which obtained 
information from a neutral state of the environment. This stage, which corresponds to the 
interaction between stable processors and flexible elements and the formation of a goal-
directed activity, is suggested to be rapid without interacting with the situation. Therefore, 
at the second stage there was no feedback loop between the system and the environment. A 
certain distribution of goals and means encoded by coefficient vectors and activation levels 
resulted from this stage. At the last stage, a new, local perceptive spot was established and 
the goal-directed process pursued its goal through interactions with the environment. The 
position of spot was able to change within the third stage.  
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First, consider the simulation of a goal-directed process with a simple goal. At stage 1, the 
constants of the environment were 80, 50, and 20. The center of perceptive spot was 
established at 0,85, the size of perceptive spot (p11) was 0,2. In addition, at this stage, p2 was 
0,2 and p3 was 4,2. This stage lasted until the mean AL exceeded 0,2. At stage 2 all constants 
were 50 and the center of the spot was at 0,5 while p2 and p11 were 0,95 and p3 became 3 at 
this and last stages. At the start of the last stage all constants were 30, and the center was 
established at 0,25 while p2 and p11 were 0,2 again.  
It was suggested that at stage 3 the process was to move perceptive spot to the right where 
there were stable processors, thus increasing CP. The state of the vectors of coefficients in 
the modules within the spot should meet the relationship between the components of 
coefficient vectors of stable processors caused by the different constants of the environment 
at stage 1. The components of input and coefficients vectors averaged across the modules 
within perceptive spot were used to describe the state of the process along with AL 
averaged across all modules. The results are in table 2 
The table shows that at stage 3, the process was increasing CP and the relationship between 
the components of the vectors of coefficients gradually became similar to that between 
constants at stage 1. The opposite relationship between the components of input vectors 
results from formula 7, after inserting a constant as an input vector in it and taking the 
relationship between the components of CVs into account. Because the constants of the 
environment were equal at stage 3, the coefficient vectors of the system were influenced by 
these constants and, as a result, the relationship formed at stage 1 tended to disappear. This 
corresponds to the completion of the process owing to the influence of the situation. It is 
important to note that the action of the system cannot be explained by combination of the 
perseveratory activity of trained modules and the inactivity of untrained ones. The fact that 
at stage 3 the relationship between the components of the vectors of coefficients was already 
weakly present at 0,48, considerably beyond the area of modules changed at stage 1 means 
that a process including most modules indeed was formed at stage 2, while increasing the 
mean AL at stage 3 implies activity in modules untrained at stage 1. 
 In another simulation, a process with a complex goal, including two constituents, was 
formed. In this simulation, stage 1 was divided in two phases. At the first phase, all 
constants were 20, the center of perceptive spot was at 0, 85, p3 was 4,2 while p2 and p11 
were 0,2. After eight iterations this phase was completed, all constants became 80 and the 
center of perceptive spot was moved to 0,65 without changing p2, p3, and p11. This was the 
second phase of stage 1 and four iterations were performed. Stage 2 in this simulation was 
the same as in the previous one. At the beginning of the last stage all constants were 10, and 
the center was established at 0, 25 while p2 and p11 were 0, 2 again. 
It was suggested that the process was to move the center of spot to the right and because 
there could be two groups of stable processors. The components of the vectors of coefficients 
within the spot could firstly increase and later decrease but the components of input vectors 
might change in the opposite direction following formula 7. To some extent, this can be 
considered as a very primitive form of multilevel activity. 
Because at any moment all constants were identical, the components of input and 
coefficients vectors in modules could be averaged within each vector and across all modules 
in the spot. As a result, one number was sufficient to describe the state of input or 
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coefficients vectors within the spot at any iteration. In addition, AL averaged across all 
modules also was used as a characteristic of the process. The results of the simulation are in 
figure 2, where for convenience, CP and AL were multiplied by 100.  
 
Iteration CP AL Constant1 Constant2 Constant3 IV1 IV2 IV3 CV1 CV2 CV3 
     Stage 1       
1 0,85 0,11 80 50 20 85,19 54,83 24,83 3,64 3,64 3,92 
2 0,85 0,13 80 50 20 84,91 55,2 25,02 11,95 8,27 4,56 
3 0,85 0,14 80 50 20 84,37 55,07 24,86 22,51 14,76 6,63 
4 0,85 0,16 80 50 20 88,36 57,55 25,88 29,22 19,01 8,32 
5 0,85 0,17 80 50 20 91,84 59,46 27,14 33,77 22,06 9,67 
6 0,85 0,18 80 50 20 94,44 61,1 28,59 37,65 24,72 10,98 
7 0,85 0,18 80 50 20 95,65 62,54 28,69 40,13 26,32 11,8 
8 0,85 0,19 80 50 20 95,82 61,48 28,09 42,11 27,62 12,48 
9 0,85 0,19 80 50 20 95,86 61,5 27,57 43,29 28,36 12,92 
10 0,85 0,21 80 50 20 95,51 61,68 28,58 44,13 28,86 13,19 
     Stage 2       
11 0,5 0,27 50 50 50 55,13 55,24 55,43 15,9 10,55 5,24 
12 0,5 0,31 50 50 50 55,02 55,03 55,36 18,53 13,46 8,5 
13 0,5 0,35 50 50 50 54,98 55,26 55,23 22,69 18,16 13,69 
14 0,5 0,39 50 50 50 55,16 55,16 55,37 25,41 21,35 17,43 
     Stage 3       
15 0,25 0,4 30 30 30 35,15 35,25 35,34 19,74 19,79 19,89 
16 0,33 0,4 30 30 30 32,36 33,76 35,65 19,42 19,55 19,73 
17 0,39 0,41 30 30 30 32,49 33,77 35,07 18,99 19,19 19,23 
18 0,43 0,41 30 30 30 33,1 34,59 35,79 17,86 17,96 18,18 
19 0,48 0,42 30 30 30 33,38 34,52 35,28 17,75 17,44 17,12 
20 0,51 0,42 30 30 30 34,03 34,19 36,29 17,85 17,1 16,35 
21 0,55 0,42 30 30 30 34,42 35,37 36,28 18,04 16,88 15,55 
22 0,57 0,43 30 30 30 35,72 36,51 38,02 17,82 16,49 14,83 
23 0,6 0,43 30 30 30 36,07 37,1 38,73 18,05 16,49 14,58 
24 0,61 0,43 30 30 30 35,94 37,92 38,61 18,34 16,68 14,82 
25 0,62 0,43 30 30 30 37,52 38,04 39,53 18,4 16,77 14,98 
26 0,63 0,44 30 30 30 37,32 38,14 39,41 18,66 16,96 15,26 
27 0,64 0,44 30 30 30 38,42 39,43 40,34 18,65 17,11 15,68 
28 0,64 0,44 30 30 30 38,17 39,83 40,62 18,8 17,32 16,08 
29 0,65 0,44 30 30 30 38,59 39,65 40,52 19 17,66 16,55 
30 0,65 0,45 30 30 30 39,41 40,04 40,87 19,28 17,99 16,95 
IV1, IV2, IV3 are the first, second, and third averaged components of input vectors; CV1, CV2, CV3 are the 
same components of the vectors of coefficients. 
Table 3. The simulation of a goal-directed process with a simple goal  
In my opinion, all of these simulations demonstrate that the processes constructed can be 
considered as goal-directed in the sense that there was a state (or states), which each 
process attempted to achieve using certain means. It is important to note that no innate 
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criterion of functioning was used to construct and perform the processes and that the 
goals of the processes treated as a source of sustainability and its means were constructed 
together.  
 CP
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Fig. 4. The simulation of a goal-directed process with a two-constituent goal 
Of course, it is easy to see certain shortcomings of the models. For example, the second 
process in model 2 was able to shift the center of the spot from one constituent to the other 
only because they were nearby. If the constituents would be established at opposite 
positions, such a shift would be impossible without changing the criterion of proximity. 
However, as is pointed out above the models simply are intended to demonstrate how the 
idea of joint synthesis can be applied to simulate goal-directed activity.  
5. Future prospects 
With the relevance of the idea of joint synthesis to simulate goal-directed activity as shown 
by the models above, it seems useful to consider some theoretical perspectives of this 
approach to the construction of intelligent systems. First, it is of importance to note that the 
consideration of the joint synthesis as the basic class of human activity and intelligence does 
not mean the abandonment of other classes and approaches. Indeed, successful attempts to 
achieve natural functionality often are not based on the imitation of a natural architecture – 
for example, cars can be considered as analogous to horses but cars have no legs, etc. 
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Similarly, it is not necessary that the joint synthesis is the only way to create full-scale 
artificial intelligence.  
Though the joint synthesis seems appropriate to construct local projects like the models 
above, I will concentrate on the construction of general artificial intelligence. In my position, 
the construction of general AI should be a consequence of gradual changes within a system 
associated with its temporal functioning and complication, i.e. a result of a shift from short –
term processes with simple goals and means to long-term processes with multilevel goals 
and complex methods. It is suggested that, although such a system may have complex 
innate architecture, the main source of its development is interactions with the system’s 
environment via feedback loops. 
The mechanism of joint synthesis is suggested to be a basis for such development. Indeed, 
because no innate criterion for the construction of goals is used, there are no constraints for 
the complication of goals. An appropriate means can be constructed for any goal because 
goals and means are constructed together,. As a result, the system is, in principle, able to 
adapt to any condition of training. It is suggested that the system can use blackboard 
architecture with flexible elements, then the formation and/or changes in elements can be 
considered as learning. The key component of the models above is the functional proximity 
that determines the possibility of the interaction between modules. It can be supposed that, 
in the hypothetical system, functional proximity can be dynamically changed in regard with 
the complexity and diversity of the system’s components. The increase in the duration of 
goal-directed process may result from alterations in something similar to AL in the models 
above.  
It can be suggested that the system should be able to create and use something similar to 
symbols. The generation of symbols may be performed as follows: because means in the 
system are constructed along with goals the system should be able to describe input and/or 
output information caused by these means in the terms consistent with goals and to 
prescribe a label associated with a goal to a sequence of such descriptions, thus creating 
symbols. The advantage of this method is that such symbols are grounded in the ongoing 
activity and therefore they can be used to construct novel goals and means through the 
involvement of symbols in the system’s blackboard. Of course, this mechanism of 
symbolization can be gradual like changes in the duration of goal-directed processes. That 
is, at the beginning, the system will prescribe labels for the short sequences of ongoing states 
and gradually to for the longer and more complex ones.  
It seems that the gradual increase in complexity and duration of goal-directed activities is a 
mechanism underlying human maturation. Indeed, in babyhood, the goal-directed activities 
of infants can be described as very short-term with primitive means but the activities of 
adults are long-lasting often life-ranging processes with very complex, hierarchical means 
and developed language. Therefore, the imitation of gradual human growth may be an 
effective way to achieve the human complexity of goal-directed activity and intelligence. 
Of course, emphasis on the joint synthesis does not imply that other methods cannot be 
used within the given approach. For example, the criterion of minimal construction costs 
permits the system to synthesize a goal and means in any situation but if the minimum of 
costs found by the system is too local then the goal and means synthesized may be 
inappropriate to the situation. This mechanism seems to be an explanation for the fact that 
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people sometimes are unable to solve simple problems, though their knowledge and skills 
are sufficient to find the right solution. To avoid similar difficulties an AI system may use 
the goals and means constructed jointly as a seed point in some cases and afterwards 
searches for goals and methods that are more suitable.  
6. Conclusion 
Since the advent of first computers, the idea of construction of artificial intelligence similar to 
that of human beings has driven the work of thousands of brilliant scientists and engineers. 
However, the result of their activity seems unsatisfactory as compared to, for example, 
advances in computer hardware. One of the most fundamental reasons for this situation may 
be that the mechanisms of human intelligence are unclear. Though the imitation of human 
intelligence is not a necessary characteristic of artificial intelligence, obviously a particular 
view on human intelligence is a very important heuristic. Therefore, an incorrect 
understanding of human intelligence can be a serious obstacle to construct intelligent systems. 
Intelligence is a characteristic of goal-directed systems and two classes of such systems can be 
easily derived from observations of animals and human beings. In my opinion, the classes that 
underlie most approaches to the construction of artificial intelligence are not sufficient to 
explain human activity. A broader classification of goal-directed activities suggests such 
processes can be described as a two-dimensional structure rather than a one-dimension one. In 
such structure there is a cell where in my opinion, humans can be located i.e., humans are 
goal-directed systems that synthesize arbitrary goals and means together. Though the idea of 
joint synthesis seems contradictory to some aspects of everyday experience, it is consistent 
with psychological evidence. In addition, there is neural evidence favoring this supposition. 
Simple computer models demonstrate that the idea of joint synthesis can be applied to 
simulate goal-directed activity. I suggest that the idea of joint synthesis can be a useful method 
to advance research in the construction of intelligent systems.  
7. Appendix  
Model 1 
p2=3*10-6 ; p3=0,99; p4=0,001 
Model 2 
p1=1; p4=2; p5=0, 3; p6=0,98; p7=0,5; p8=0,3; p9=0,8; p10=0,8 
8. References 
Asaad, W. F., Rainer, G. & Miller, E. K. (2000). Task-specific neural activity in the primate 
prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 84, 451–459.  
Bäck, T. (1996). Evolutionary Algorithms in Theory and Practice: Evolution Strategies, 
Evolutionary Programming, Genetic Algorithms. Oxford Univ. Press. 
Bertalanffy, L. von, (1968). General Systems Theory.  
Bertino, E, Piero, G & Zarria, B.C. (2001). Intelligent Database Systems. Addison-Wesley 
Professional. 
Buller, D. J. (1998) DeFreuding evolutionary psychology: adaptation and human motivation, 
in Hardcastle, V. G., Ed. Psychology Meets Biology: Connections, Conjectures, 
Constraints. MIT Press/Bradford Books. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents 
 /disk0/00/00/03/26/cog00000326-00/defreud.htm 
www.intechopen.com
 
Intelligent Systems 
 
342 
Cooper, R. P., & Shallice, T. (1995). Soar and the case for unified theories of cognition. 
Cognition , 55,2,:115-49.  
Corkill, D.D. (1991). Blackboard Systems. AI Expert, 6(9),40-47. 
Corsini, R.J. & Auerbach, A.J. (1998). Concise encyclopedia of psychology. Wiley. 
Craig, I. (1995). Blackboard Systems. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences , 10, 454-459. 
Fuster, J.M. (1997). Network memory. Trends Neuroscience, 20, 451–459 
Haykin, S (1998). Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Foundation. Prentice Hall 
Heckhausen, H. (1980). Motivation und Handeln. Springer-Verlag 
Jackson, P. (1998). Introduction to Expert Systems.  
Joseph, R. (1999). Frontal lobe psychopathology: mania, depression, confabulation, 
catatonia, perseveration, obsessive compulsions, and schizophrenia. Psychiatry, 
62(2), 138-72. 
Holland, J.H. (1975). Adaptation in natural and artificial systems. University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor. 
Leslie, K. P. , Littman, M.L & Moore, A.W. (1996). Reinforcement Learning: A Survey. 
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 4, 237–285. 
Luria, A.R. (1966). Higher cortical functions in man. Tavistock. Publications, Andover, Hants. 
Luria, A.R. (1973). Foundations of neuropsychology. Moscow State University Press (in Russian). 
Luria, A.R. (1982). Variants of the “frontal” syndrome. In Luria A.R, Homskaya E.D. (eds.), 
Functions of the frontal lobes of the brain, pp. 8-48, Nauka ( in Russian).  
Miller, B.T. & D’Esposito, M. (2005). Searching for ‘‘the top’’ in top-down control. Neuron, 
48, 535–538.  
Miller, E.K. & Cohen, J.D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annual 
Review Neuroscience, 24,167–202 
Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard. 
Prudkov, P. N. & Rodina, O.N.(1999). Synthesis of Purposeful Processes. PSYCOLOQUY 
10(070). psyc.99.10.070.purposeful-processes.1.prudkov. 
Rodina, O.N. & Prudkov, P.N. (2005). The principle of joint synthesis in purposeful 
processes. MGU Bulletin Psychology, 2, 77-86 (in Russian).  
Russell, S. J. & Norvig, P. (2003). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Stanovich, K.E. & West, R.F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the 
rationality debate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645-726. 
Sutton, R. S. & Barto, A.G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press.  
Tooby, J. & Cosmides L., (1992) The psychological foundations of culture, in J. H. Barkow, L. 
Cosmides, and J. Tooby (eds.) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the 
Generation of Culture pp. 19-136, NY Oxford University Press. 
Tooby, J., Cosmides, L. & Barrett, H. C. (2005). Resolving the debate on innate ideas: 
Learnability constraints and the evolved interpenetration of motivational and 
conceptual functions. In Carruthers, P., Laurence, S. & Stich, S. (Eds.), The Innate 
Mind: Structure and Content. NY: Oxford University Press. 
Van der Velde, F. & de Kamps, M. (2003). A model of visual working memory in PFC. 
Neurocomputing, 52-54, 419-424. 
Van der Velde, F. & de Kamps, M. (2006). Neural blackboard architectures of combinatorial 
structures in cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29, 37-70  
Wood J.N. & Grafman J. (2003). Human prefrontal cortex: processing and representational 
perspectives. Nature Review Neuroscience, 4, 139–147. 
www.intechopen.com
Intelligent Systems
Edited by Prof. Vladimir M. Koleshko
ISBN 978-953-51-0054-6
Hard cover, 366 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 02, March, 2012
Published in print edition March, 2012
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
This book is dedicated to intelligent systems of broad-spectrum application, such as personal and social
biosafety or use of intelligent sensory micro-nanosystems such as "e-nose", "e-tongue" and "e-eye". In
addition to that, effective acquiring information, knowledge management and improved knowledge transfer in
any media, as well as modeling its information content using meta-and hyper heuristics and semantic
reasoning all benefit from the systems covered in this book. Intelligent systems can also be applied in
education and generating the intelligent distributed eLearning architecture, as well as in a large number of
technical fields, such as industrial design, manufacturing and utilization, e.g., in precision agriculture,
cartography, electric power distribution systems, intelligent building management systems, drilling operations
etc. Furthermore, decision making using fuzzy logic models, computational recognition of comprehension
uncertainty and the joint synthesis of goals and means of intelligent behavior biosystems, as well as diagnostic
and human support in the healthcare environment have also been made easier.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Pavel N. Prudkov (2012). Intelligent Biosystems and the Idea of the Joint Synthesis of Goals and Means,
Intelligent Systems, Prof. Vladimir M. Koleshko (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-51-0054-6, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/intelligent-systems/intelligent-biosystems-and-the-idea-of-the-joint-
synthesis-of-goals-and-means-
© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
